Introduction
Consider an owner of a building who wishes to install a new lift in her building. A potential seller tells the owner that two types of lifts are possible, A 1 or A 2 , but she will find out which is the right choice only after conducting some initial investigation. The contract, however, needs to be written now.
As is common with many such procurement contracts, it is only the seller who observes, and then tells the buyer, which alternative best suits the buyer's needs. The uncertainty here concerns not merely the seller's own costs of installing different lifts; rather it involves all relevant aspects of the environment, including how much each lift should be worth to the buyer.
The buyer and the seller therefore write a contract that postulates the terms of trade contingent on the seller's recommendation (as to which lift should be installed).
Upon finishing the initial investigation, the seller however makes an unexpected announcement: the situation turns out to be unexpectedly complex, and as a result, she cannot tell for sure which of the two lifts, A 1 or A 2 , is the correct choice. The seller then recommends another lift, say G, which is a better option under these unforeseen circumstances.
What is crucial about this rather common story of renegotiation is asymmetric information. After all, there is nothing abnormal about not being able to foresee all relevant future contingencies, and moreover, the buyer has no way of verifying whether or not the claim is true. Then, how can the buyer dismiss for sure that the seller is not lying? Renegotiation may therefore happen even when the seller is making a false claim. This paper formalises this kind of contracting situations which feature asymmetric information and the possibility of unforeseen contingency. We find that, modelled in the way described above, asymmetric information coupled with a plausible behavioural assumption on the uninformed player's foresight/awareness of the environment can result in a seemingly complete contract being written and then renegotiated along its outcome path to generate inefficiency ex post.
We therefore propose a fresh perspective on the role of renegotiation, based on asymmetric information and unforeseen contingency. Our approach departs from the traditional (complete information) contracting literature which views renegotiation as a constraint on contracting and explains its occurrence through some form of contractual incompleteness that it creates (Maskin and Moore, 1999; Maskin and Tirole, 1999; Hart and Moore, 1999; Segal, 1999; Che and Hausch, 1999) . Also, in this literature, renegotiation is assumed to be always efficient, and hence, the source of inefficiency is often associated with the "hold up" problem ex ante (Hart, 1995) .
To concretely illustrate our arguments, let us revisit the above example with more details. There are two possible states of nature, and the statecontingent payoff consequences of the three lifts are summarised in the table The sequence of events is as follows. First, the seller offers a contract which the buyer can accept or reject. The buyer's reservation payoff, which she obtains upon rejecting a contract offer, is zero. Second, the seller receives a private signal about the state of nature and then sends a message to the buyer. Third, the seller may opt to make a take-it-or-leave-it renegotiation offer to the buyer. If the seller opts not to make a renegotiation offer, or if she does make an offer which is rejected, the original contract is enforced. Given this, and since it is not possible to verify the seller's claim, let us assume that the buyer takes the (unexpected) message at its face value.
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She then accepts the renegotiation offer since her expected payoff from the contracted trade is 0 while she obtains from the renegotiation
Moreover, the following is also true here. If the buyer were to respond in such a way to the unforeseen contingency claim, then the seller would want to renegotiate even if she were to observe state 1. To see this, note that in this state the seller's payoff under the original contract is 10 − 5 = 5, while with the renegotiated deal it is (11 − ) − 4 = 7 − > 5 since ∈ (0, 2). It can be readily verified that, if the seller observes state 2, she is better off staying with the contract.
At the time of contracting, of course, it is not expected that the seller will be unable to learn the identity of the optimal trading opportunity: this is an unforeseen contingency. Therefore, the buyer may well not anticipate that the seller could actually send such a message. This being the case, she will agree to the original contract if offered, and the seller will indeed offer it, knowing that, while she would stick with the contract in one of the two foreseen contingencies, she would be able to induce renegotiation in the other.
The net effect is that we may well see a seemingly complete contract being written and then renegotiated on the path of play, and moreover, the renegotiation leads to an inefficient trade. The seller obtains a greater payoff this way, compared to enforcing the contract and making the efficient trade in each state, at the expense of the buyer whose actual expected payoff is below her reservation payoff.
This insight is driven by the assumptions that (i) the buyer is unable to verify the truth of a message when reported and (ii) the buyer lacks the foresight to "expect the unexpected" and anticipate the possibility that the seller claims not to have learned the realised state.
While the first asymmetric information assumption is prevalent, the second assumption, which has a "behavioural" flavour, is also plausible because of asymmetric information. What this assumption captures is the likely fact that the uninformed buyer possesses limited knowledge of the environment.
For example, she may not be aware of the third alternative G in the first instance and only later learns about its availability, presumably through the seller's "newly arrived" information. The seller, on the other hand, is an experienced repeat player in the business, and therefore, should know more about the environment. It is also plausible that she should have better understanding of her customer's behaviour (i.e. that the customer does not expect an unforeseen contingency claim at the contract writing stage) than the customer herself.
The rest of the paper presents a more general treatment of the above ideas and results. In Section 2, we describe the basic model (in the spirit of the "widget" models of Segal, 1999, Hart and , and others), without the possibility of unforeseen contingency and renegotiation, in which asymmetric information poses no restriction to the scope of contracting and efficiency. Section 3 then introduces our two key assumptions on the buyer's beliefs in response to an unforeseen contingency claim by the seller and on the buyer's limited awareness/foresight at the contract writing stage. The extensive form concerning renegotiation and the equilibrium concept are also spelled out in this section. In Section 4, the main results are presented. We demonstrate that, even if the buyer believes an unforeseen contingency claim to be true with an arbitrarily small probability, it is possible to find an equilibrium in which a contract is written and then renegotiated along the outcome path to generate an inefficient trade. Finally, Section 5 relates our results to the recent literature on incomplete contracts and renegotiation in closer detail. In particular, we argue that our analysis offers an explanation for why individuals may indeed be reluctant to commit not to renegotiate. (for i = 1, 2). For expositional simplicity, we impose a symmetric structure over these parameters such that
where v > c andĉ > c > 0. Thus, widget a 1 is "special" only in state A 1 , while it is widget a 2 which offers the high-surplus generating opportunity in state A 2 .
Widget g is "generic" in that it yields the same surplus in all possible states of nature. We shall denote the value of this surplus by G. Although the surplus is fixed, g's valuation and cost are state-dependent. We assume that widget g yields both higher valuation and cost in A 2 than in A 1 (think of the "gold-plated" and "cheap" imitation widgets suggested by Segal, 1999) .
Specifically, we assume
where v Notice here that (2) assumes the cross-state difference in the generic widget's payoff consequences to be exactly equal to that in the costs of producing a special widget. This simplifies the analysis. As we shall see below, these two parametric features of the model are critical determinants of the results, but the central insights can be most economically conveyed with them treated as one parameter.
We make two further assumptions about the nature of the problem. First, a special widget, if traded in the right state, yields a greater surplus than the generic widget.
Second, the generic widget surplus has the following lower bound.
This inequality implies that the generic widget performs better than a special widget under uncertainty; that is, the fixed surplus G is greater than the expected surplus from trading either special widget. We shall henceforth refer to this property of the generic widget as risk dominance. The main objective of the present paper is to investigate what can be achieved by an ex ante contract. For this purpose, we make no explicit description of the game that may be played in the absence of a contract, such as some ex post bargaining game. We simply assume that, should the players fail to agree on a contract, they proceed to obtain some reservation payoffs, which are normalized to zero. There are always gains from engaging in a trade with each other, but the opportunity arises only if the players enter into a contractual relationship.
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Under the revelation principle, we focus on revelation contracts in which S reports her private information. Let us define t = (a, p) as a trade specifying a widget to be traded, a ∈ A, and its price, p ∈ R. Let T denote the set of all such trades. A revelation contract, z, is then defined as a function z : Θ → T such that z(θ) ∈ T for each θ, specifying the terms of trade for each message.
The extensive form of the model is as follows. There are two stages. In
Stage 1, the players negotiate a contract. In particular, we assume that S decides whether or not to make a take-it-or-leave-it offer of a contract which B then either accepts or rejects. If a contract is agreed, we move to Stage 2.
If a contract is offered and rejected, or if S chooses not to offer a contract, the game ends with the players getting their reservation payoffs. The sequence of events in Stage 2 is as follows. At the beginning of the stage, nature draws a state; then S sends a message θ ∈ Θ followed by production and trade taking place according to the terms of trade stipulated by the contract.
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We assume for now that the players can commit not to renegotiate.
Let E z (θ) ⊆ A be the set of equilibrium outcomes of contract z in Stage 2 when the realised state is θ. (We shall later lay out more details about the equilibrium concept when the possibility of unforeseen contingency and renegotiation are introduced. The problem is trivial at this point.) We then say that a contract z implements a trade rule
such that "hold-up" is a feature of null contract and ex post (re)negotiation. The trade opportunities arise only if a sufficient level of investment is made up front but null contract induces under-investment. The contracting problem is confined to the problem of ex post incentives as it suffices to convey the idea of the paper. 4 S's production capacity is just one unit of a widget.
Let z p define a revelation contract such that z
The following result is trivial. Under the bargaining structure assumed for the contract negotiation stage, an equilibrium contract of the model is one that gives S the maximum expected payoff while giving B her reservation payoff.
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It then follows that:
is an equilibrium contract of the model.
What we thus have here is a simple contracting model in which asymmetric information does not limit the scope of contracting in any way. There are substantial common interests here, and therefore, it is straightforward to make the informed player always want to trade the correct widget. Notice also that the generic widget plays no role whatsoever. As we shall shortly see, however, the presence of this alternative plays an important role when we introduce the possibility of unforeseen contingency and renegotiation. Having such a simple, efficient benchmark will serve to highlight the impact of the added features.
5 A contract may of course generate multiple equilibrium outcomes with different pay-
offs. In what follows, however, the equilibrium contract generates a unique payoff to S.
3 Unforeseen Contingency and Renegotiation
We now introduce the possibility of unforeseen contingency and renegotiation to the basic model described above.
Behavioural Assumptions
In Stage 1, the players anticipate that S will perfectly learn the state of nature when revealed. Consider now that, in Stage 2, having written a contract, S claims an unforeseen contingency that she has not in fact been able to observe the realised state, and therefore, is still equally uncertain as to whether it is A 1 or A 2 . How should B respond?
Although ex ante B does not foresee the possibility of such an event,
we take the stance that, ex post when S claims an unforeseen contingency, B does not entirely dismiss the possibility that S may be telling the truth.
After all, it is a common practice not to anticipate all relevant contingencies, and moreover, there is asymmetric information; B cannot actually verify S's claim.
In order to formally model this idea, let us first introduce some notation.
With slight abuse of notation, define Θ = {A 1 , A 2 , φ} as the set of seller "types", where A 1 (A 2 ) is the anticipated type who observes nature's draw and learns the state to be A 1 (A 2 ) and φ the unanticipated type who does not observe nature's draw. For expositional clarity, in what follows, θ will index a type and σ will refer to a message. Also, define q as a probability distribution on Θ , and let Q denote the set of all such distributions.
Then, we define B's prior beliefs over the possible seller types, denoted by ψ, as a mapping We now present our key assumption below. It is natural to treat as taking a small value. If it is large, or indeed = 1, Assumption 3 amounts to saying that B takes message φ at (near) its face value, which is less plausible and conveys more of a bounded rationality flavour.
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However, we do not rule our this extreme possibility. As will be shown below, the magnitude of does not affect the substantive contents of the results.
Next, we make an additional assumption about the extent of the uninformed player's forecasting capability/awareness of the environment.
Assumption 4 B does not "expect the unexpected"; that is, in Stage 1, B
anticipates only σ = A 1 or σ = A 2 in Stage 2. S knows this in Stage 1.
As argued earlier, we view this to be a plausible behavioural assumption, particularly in light of the type of asymmetric information modelled. S can be thought of as an experienced seller in the business possessing superior knowledge of the environment than her customers who only seldom enter the market. For instance, B may initially know only about the availability of the two special widgets, while S knows that the generic widget is also available.
In such a relationship, it is also likely that the seller knows more about how a customer behaves than the customer herself. However, we do not emphasise this view; rather, Assumption 3 seems a realistic description of how an individual would respond to an unforeseen contingency claim that cannot be verified. From the bounded rationality perspective, this paper may be considered related to some recent papers that study the impact of information processing errors explicitly (for example, Crawford, 2003; Eyster and Rabin, 2005; Ettinger and Jehiel, 2007) , and also, to the literature on non-partitional information structures (for example, Geanakoplos, 1989; Brandenburger et al., 1992; Lipman, 1995; Rubinstein, 1998 
Contract, Renegotiation and Equilibrium
The assumptions asserted above naturally motivate renegotiation. In particular, we are interested in whether the informed player can exploit the uninformed player's imperfect awareness of the environment by writing a contract that allows her to later pretend that the unforeseen contingency has taken place and subsequently induce renegotiation to the inefficient generic widget. Since the generic widget risk-dominates the special widgets, it is the efficient widget to trade if S is telling the truth when announcing φ.
A contract is now defined by z : {A 1 , A 2 , φ} → T . Since type φ is not expected by B (Assumption 4), a natural way to interpret φ as a contract clause here is to think of it as representing non-announcement of either A 1 or
A 2 (assuming that this is itself verifiable). A contract then offers a complete
contracting with dynamically inconsistent preferences where the agents are assumed to be "naive" and imperfectly aware of their future selves at the contract writing stage while the principal correctly knows them. See, for example, O'Donoghue and Rabin (1999), Dellavigna and Malmendier (2004) and Eliaz and Spiegler (2006) .
coverage of all possible contingencies: A 1 , A 2 or else.
Moreover, a contract is subject to renegotiation. The following defines the contract game. In Stage 2 (after a contract has been agreed and the state of nature revealed), S first sends a message; subsequently B has an option to propose a fresh take-it-or-leave-it offer of a trade which S can either accept (Y ) or reject (N ). If B makes a renegotiation offer and S rejects it, or if B makes no renegotiation offer, the contract is enforced. We need to introduce some extra notation at this juncture. First, define the set of all (partial) histories within the contract game relevant for actions 8 A shaper result (in terms of uniqueness of the equilibrium set) is obtained if we consider the alternative renegotiation process in which S gets to make an offer (see the next section). However, since the proposed renegotiation works against B's interests, we shall present the case in which B has the bargaining power at renegotiation.
as
where, with some abuse of notation, ∅ implies the beginning of the contract game, (σ) refers to the partial history of message σ, and finally, (σ, t) refers to the partial history of message σ followed by renegotiation offer t. Let h index an element of this set.
Also, let us define
H j = {h ∈ H| it is j's turn to play after h}.
We thus have
We can then define S's strategy as a mapping
B's strategy as a mapping
where, with some further abuse of notation, ∅ refers to no renegotiation offer.
We also want to define B's posterior beliefs. Let µ(θ|h) denote her belief
as B's belief system.
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Let E z be the set of perfect Bayesian equilibria of the contract game induced by contract z. Also let e = (f S , f B , µ) refer to a single perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE). To constitute an equilibrium, f B has to be such that, at every h ∈ H B , B chooses the optimal renegotiation offer given the opponent strategies f S and her posterior (Bayesian) beliefs µ, and f S has to be optimal for each type θ ∈ Θ at every h ∈ H S against f B and µ.
B's equilibrium beliefs µ are formulated by the Bayes' rule and the opponent equilibrium strategies f S while being consistent with Assumption 3.
On the other hand, since ψ(φ) = q such that q (φ) = , µ(φ|φ) may be positive depending on the equilibrium (and the contract).
For example, in a pooling equilibrium such that f S (θ, ∅) = φ for all θ ∈ Θ , we must have that µ(φ|φ) = and µ(A 1 |φ) = µ(A 2 |φ) =
1− 2
; in a separating equilibrium such that f S (θ, ∅) = θ for each θ ∈ Θ , we must have that
Finally, if we from now on say that a contract constitutes an equilibrium contract of the model then we mean a contract that, under the additional assumptions made in the previous sub-section, maximises S's expected payoff among the contracts that will be accepted if offered. Letẑ define the following contract:
Main Result
An alternative, and more convincing, interpretation of this contract is: It is straightforward to establish that in the absence of Assumption 3 this contract will implement π * . Then, since B does not expect the unexpected in Stage 1, her ex ante perceived payoff from this contract is equal to her reservation payoff. Thus, we can make the following statement.
Remark 1 B acceptsẑ if offered in Stage 1.
We now characterise the set of PBEs of contractẑ in Stage 2. In particular, it will be shown that, under certain parametric configurations, S has incentives to induce renegotiation in state A 1 , but not in state A 2 , such that the inefficient generic widget ends up getting traded; moreover, the resulting surplus is distributed such that, despite sub-optimality of the total surplus generated, S does better than (or at least as well as) what she would otherwise obtain from always telling the truth and trading the efficient widget.
Let us first illustrate this in the special case where = 1. Proof. Define u θ (t) as type θ seller's payoff from making trade t. Let us consider the following profileê = (f S ,f B , µ) where
First, it is straightforward to check that the beliefs are consistent with Assumption 3 (for = 1) and the Bayes' rule on the equilibrium path.
Second, let us check optimality off B . It suffices to establish thatf
Thus, givenf S and the beliefs µ ( = 1), renegotiation offer (g,p) following φ will yield the following expected payoff to B:
where the last inequality follows from Assumption 2. Thus, we establish optimality off B (φ) = (g,p).
Third, let us check optimality off S . For each θ, the second part on the responses to B's renegotiation offers is obviously optimal, as isf S (φ, ∅) = φ.
It therefore remains to consider what each of the other types could obtain from mimicking type φ.
Consider type A 2 . Givenf B (φ) above, announcing message φ and accepting the subsequent renegotiation offer gives her a payof
Thus, mimicking φ is not worthwhile for A 2 .
Consider type A 1 . Givenf B (φ) above, announcing message φ and accepting the subsequent renegotiation offer gives her a payof
Thus, mimicking φ is optimal for A 1 . This completes the proof thatê ∈ Eẑ.
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Finally, it is straightforward to show that the expected payoffs of the two parties in the above equilibrium match the claim.
The intuition for the above result is straightforward. B takes the face value of the report that an unforeseen contingency has occurred and the world is equally likely to be A 1 or A 2 . Also, the generic widget risk-dominates either special widget. Therefore, upon receiving message φ, B will make a renegotiation offer to trade the generic widget instead of trading a 1 as stipulated by contractẑ. Such renegotiation is worthwhile for S only in state A 1 because the cost of producing the generic widget is higher in state A 2 . In fact, the difference in these costs across the states is sufficiently large (since we assume c
) that the offered renegotiation price makes S indifferent between renegotiating (and trading the inefficient generic widget) and enforcing the contract (and trading the efficient special widget).
We now demonstrate that contractẑ can admit the same type of equilibrium in the general case for any ∈ (0, 1). The additional requirement is that d, which measures both the cross-state difference in the costs/valuations of the generic widget and that in the costs of the special widgets, is sufficiently large. We want the first of these two differences (c Let us consider the following profileê = (f S ,f B , µ) where
First, it is straightforward to check that the beliefs are consistent with Assumption 3 and the Bayes' rule on the equilibrium path.
Second, let us check optimality off B . Givenf S and µ,f B (A 1 ) andf B (A 2 ) are obviously optimal. Let us consider the remaining part of B's strategy.
and
This implies that renegotiation offer (g,p) would be accepted by both type φ and type A 1 . Notice also thatf S (φ, (φ, g, p) 
Thus, givenf S and µ, renegotiation offer (g,p) following message φ will yield the following expected payoff to B:
where the last inequality follows from d ≥d. Thus, we establish optimality off B (φ) = (g,p).
Third, let us check optimality off S . For each θ, the second part on the responses to B's renegotiation offers is obviously optimal. Let us consider the first part on the message choice. Givenf B , (3), (4) and µ, it is straightforward to check optimality off S (φ, ∅) andf S (A 1 , ∅) as above. For the remainder, it suffices to show that for type A 2 it is not worthwhile to mimic type φ. By sending message φ and accepting the subsequent renegotiation offer (g,p), type A 2 would get a payof
which establishes just that. This completes the proof thatê ∈ Eẑ.
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Notice that the equilibriumê established above in Propositions 2 and 3 is not the unique PBE of contractẑ because, in state A 1 , S is actually indifferent between reporting the truth and claiming the unforeseen contingency; both yield a payoff v − c. This means that there also exists a fully separating equilibrium in which the contract is enforced to deliver the efficient trade in both states A 1 and A 2 . However, it is easily seen that there cannot be any other equilibrium outcome (and payoff to S). The reason is that, given the higher cost of producing the generic widget, type A 2 would never want to mimic type φ, and therefore, pooling can only occur between types A 1 and φ as in the posited equilibrium.
Nonetheless, we emphasise the reported equilibrium, and renegotiation, for the following reasons. First, the multiplicity of equilibria is no longer an issue if we consider an alternative extensive form for the contract game and allow instead S to make a take-it-or-leave-it renegotiation offer (as in fact assumed for the example discussed in Introduction). In this case, from the proof of Proposition 2 above, it is straightforward to show that, with sufficiently large d, there cannot be a fully separating equilibrium since otherwise type A 1 could become strictly better off by deviating to mimic type φ and induce renegotiation. Thus, we can derive a unique PBE which implements the same trades as reported in Propositions 2 and 3 above and gives S an expected payoff strictly greater than v − c. It is obvious that contractẑ generates the highest possible payoff for S among all the contracts that are acceptable to B. Thus, we can put together Remark 2 and Propositions 2 and 3 to state the following Corollary.
Corollary 2 For any
thenẑ is an equilibrium contract of the model. Let us summarise our result. S possesses private information not just on her own costs of producing different widgets but also on how much each widget is worth to B. Moreover, B lacks the foresight/awareness to expect the unexpected at the contract writing stage, that S may later claim an unforeseen contingency. These two features allow S to induce agreement of a contract which will be renegotiated along its outcome path. In one of the two (foreseen) states, S falsely claims an unforeseen contingency and recommends a new action, which is in fact inefficient. Since the claim cannot be verified, B does not entirely dismiss it and attaches a small probability that S is telling the truth. Indeed, given the right parameters, there is a price at which such renegotiation is optimal for both parties. Despite inefficiency, this leads to S earning more than (or at least as much as) what she could otherwise obtain 30 from truthfully revealing her information and enforcing the contract to trade the efficient widget. Renegotiation makes B worse off.
Commitment Not To Renegotiate
Our results are closely related to the recent literature on incomplete contracts and commitment not to renegotiate. In the traditional contracting/implementation models, renegotiation is treated as a constraint affecting the scope of off-the-equilibrium punishments (Maskin and Moore, 1999) . In some cases, this goes as far as being the critical factor in driving optimality of null, hence incomplete, contracts.
The debate between Maskin and Tirole (1999) , henceforth MT, and Hart and Moore (1999), henceforth HM, is particularly relevant to us. MT define unforeseen contingencies in terms of ex ante (in)describability of actions (widgets) and argue that, modelled as such, unforeseen contingencies per se need not constrain the scope of contracting as long as the contracting parties can forecast their payoff consequences. Clever message contracts can be devised such that the details of unforeseen contingencies are filled in ex post and correct incentives provided. However, this irrelevance result rests critically on the no-renegotiation assumption. HM show that, when the players cannot commit not to renegotiate, ex ante indescribability of future events can indeed generate optimal incomplete contracts.
But, if renegotiation is such an important source of contractual incompleteness and inefficiency, why is it so prevalent? This observation is puzzling because the theory suggests an ample reason for individuals to bind themselves not to renegotiate when writing a contract, even in the presence of unforeseen contingencies (for example, by involving a third party). We now argue that our analysis offers an explanation for why individuals may indeed be reluctant to rule out renegotiation.
Consider S offering the following contract to B:
CONTRACT: If S sends message A 1 (A 2 ), B and S trade a 1 (a 2 ) at price v; otherwise, S pays B a large penalty.
Notice that this contract effectively shuts off any chance of renegotiation (provided that the penalty is large enough) and achieves the first-best.
However, we have shown that this contract may not emerge in equilibrium of the model. In the equilibrium that we identify, the players agree on a contract which is renegotiated along its outcome path; in other words, the players choose not to commit not to renegotiate. This results from the seller exploiting her superior informational position and her trading partner's lack of foresight/awareness.
It is also worth mentioning that the aforementioned literature on incomplete contracts and renegotiation assumes that the players have complete information and renegotiation always yields an efficient outcome ex post.
Thus, renegotiation is often associated with inefficiency ex ante such as the relationship-specific investments (Che and Hausch, 1999) .
hold up problem. In contrast, notice that the type of renegotiation postulated here generates inefficiency ex post.
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Finally, how incomplete is the equilibrium contract highlighted in this paper? On the one hand, it is complete in the sense that it accounts for all the relevant contingencies (message φ is part of a contract). At the same time, however, the contract fails to be renegotiation-proof, and this may be viewed as a symptom of incompleteness.
